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Abstract
A protectionist trade policy encourages foreign direct investment (FDI). If do-
mestic producers prefer to compete with imports, they do not want unlimited pro-
tection. Inatead, the desired level of protection is increasing in disincentives to
direct investment. This may help explain why protection is higher (i) in industries
where the country has a comparative disadvantage, (ii) in declining industries, (iii)
in recessions. Fear of foreign direct investment can also explain the popularity of
vol~uitary expurl restraiuts mlativo tu uthi~r funu, uf proti~ctiou. Finally, wiUt en-
doRenmis protortion, tht,rc is t.ypirally a nrt;ative relationship betwcen the level of
protection and the volumc o[ Flll.
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1 Introduction
1llany :wthurs have :uguc~d that a c-urmtry', trade policy is likely Lo reOeca the preferences
of strong interest grortps. (For a survey of this literature, see Hillman (1989).) Since in
most industries sellers are far better organized than buyers, who are often individuals,
and domestic firms are normally in a better position to influence politicians than are their
foreign competitors, we should expect the pattern of protection to reflect the interest of
thc dornestic industry.
A first step toward testing this hypothesis is to identify the levels of protection desited
by various industries- However, most authors have merely taken the answer for granted:
Any industry wants as much protection as it can get. Thus the level of protection should
be positively correlated with the political in(iuence of the industry. Implicitly, this as-
.nnrpl.iun undc,rlic~s mutit uf Lhr r,nrpiric-:rl work in t.hc arca, including t.hc rontrihntirnrs
uf McPherson (1972), Pincus (19ïFi), Caves (1976), Salamon and Siegfried (1977), Ray
(1981), Marvel and R.ay (1983), and Baldwin (1985). These papers estimate the relation-
ship between several industry variables and the level of import protection achieved by
the industry. If there is a strong positive relationship between some industry character-
istic and the protection level, this characteristic is said to enhance an industry's political
in(luence.
But is it really true that high levels of protection is an objective of all domestic
industries? There are at least two reasons for questioning this assumption. One is that
sti(f protection may encourage new entry by domestic firms as the foreign competition
wc~akc-n.. A.c-c-und ro:~,un. whic L will bc~ Lhr main foc-us of t.his p:rper, is that a high
Ievel uf protectiun may teinpt foreign competitors to jump the trade barrier througl~ local
production. An example. would be the decision of Japanese car manufacturers to establish
U. S. production plants:
In fact, United States quotas and orderly market arrangements simply ac-
cellerate the rate at which the Japanese become full-line competitors here.
Within a few years of coming on shore, the Japanese become a stronger force
than i( thcy had remained mere exporters. New York Timest
~Sec tlout (IJ84). Thomas A1. Ilout, thc author of the arlide, waa then a vice president with the3
The Ia.St sentencc is essential. Foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) is likely to
bc mure cornpetitive than irnports are. Thus, from the vantage point of domestic firms,
modest. protect ion may be~ prr`ferahle to a t.rado policy that induce~s the foreign competitor
to start local production. The question we pose in this paper is how much protection the
dornestic inclustry doe.c want, and to what extent this is reAected in actual policy.
Clearly, the question can only be properly analyzed in the context of imperfectly
competitive markets. Only then do domestic firms have rents to defend, and only then
do they care about the behavior of a foreign rival. A general feature of oligopoly models
with competing firms is that a firm's profit is increasing in its competitors' mazginal cost.~
Here is the key to our first set of results. Suppose the multinational prefers to export in
the case where the tariff is zero. By increasing the tariff, the government can improve
domestic firms' profit, as long as the multinational does not make a direct investment. So,
if domestic firms know their foreign competitor's cost function, they will typically want
t.he governnu~nt to irnpose the, "IimiL" level of protection, i. e. the highest level that does
nut iuduce direcL iuvestment.
One implication is immediate. Industries in which the country has a comparative
disadvantage should be more protected. In these industries foreign producers will stay
at. homc to takc~ advanLagc, of lhc lowcr production costs. This prediction is strongly
supported by the evidence in Ray (1981) and Marvel and Ray (1983).
The theory also has dynamic implications. In any given industry, low levels of demand
meaus that it is less Lempting to invest in new production facilities, and so the tariff can
be increased. This is consistent with the notion that there are higher levels of protection
in declining industries as well as in recessions.
While tariffs affect the multinational's marginal cost, quotas restrict their output
directly. Again, it is a general feature of oligopoly models that a firm's profit is decreasing
in competitors' output. Note that in the absence of direct investments, there is always a
quota which is as beneficial to domestic firms as any given tariff, and vice versa. When
climct. invosl.in~~nt. is .cn upl.iun, huwow~r, w~~ shuw Lhat ~luinc~el.ir tirms prcG~r vulnnL:u'Y
expurl, rc~strainLs (VI;R.) lo ol.hcr fonns of protc~ction. The intuition is :r.ti follows. With
B~uton Consulting Croup.
'-If firms elo not rompct~, i. e. products arc romplemcnLS, this rclationship Joes not hold.4
a VGR, the rnultinational does not have to hand over money to the importing country.
Therefore exporting is a more attractive option for any given level of output. As a result, it
is possible to curtail imports more effectively using a quota than a tariff, without inducing
direct investment.
It is an extreme assumption that domestic firms know precisely the level of protection
thaL will iuducc I:'DL Alluwiug for irupcrfecL iufurmation, wc shuw tlrat therc may be h'lll
in equilibriurn. Eiut., since protection is endogenous, there need no longer be a positive
mlal.iuuship b~~twi,~~n Lh,- Ir~v,~l u( proti,cl.iuu and t.hr probabilily uf din,ct invcstmcut iu
equilibrium. ludecd, there is good reason t.o expect a negative correlation. TLis coutrasts
with the case where protection is exogenous, where the relationship must be positive (as
demonstrated by Horst (1971) among others). Thus, our paper may shed new light on the
empirical evidence presented by Orr (1975). Contrary to the received wisdom, he found
no significant correlation between protection and FDI, and ccefficients were negative.
1'hr papr~r is urganized :u follows. Scction 2 contains the basic model and shows óow
the lirnit tarifi depends on cost conditions. Comparative statics with respect to demand
conditions are presented in section 3. Section 4 shows that domestic firms prefer a VER
to any other policy instrument. In section 5, we relax the assumption that information is
perfect, and show that asymmetric information about the multinational's cost is a reason
why foreign direct investment may occur in equilibrium. We also prove that protection
and the probability of direct investment are likely to be negatively correlated. Related
literature is briefly surveyed in section 6. Final remarks are collected in section 7.
2 The Model
"I'hr~ro :rn~ t.wu ruunt.rii~s, labe,lr~d :1 and B. Wc :rrc intcrestcd in thc rnarkct for a particular
product, which is sold in country A only. There are n domestic producers (firms located in
country A). In country B, there is a single firm, the multinalional, which also possesses the
relevant production technology.3 The multinational can locate production in country B
or make an investrnent and produce directly in country A. If it produces in country B
~Notice that parallel import is ruled out by the assumption that all goods are sold in market A. There
is no cntry ur cxit. These assumptions greatly simplify the analysis.5
the sales are subjected to a tariff in country A. The government of country A sets the
tariff, and is assumed to maximize some function that is strictly increasing in the profit
of each domestic firm.
"I'he~ time order of decisions is as follows. The government of country A sets the tariff.
Thc multinational then decidcs whcre to produce. Finally, all firms play a quantity or
pricr competition ganu~, to bc. called thc market game, in the A market.
Wi~ :c...un~r Lhal. Lhc~ in:u'kc~t h:unc~ h:G, a uuiqw~ and sl.ahlr (iu Lhc~ s~~nxc~ uf UixiL ( 197i(i))
Nash equilibrium in which all tirms produce and sell positive quantities. This guarantees
that a firm's profit will be increasing in other firms' marginal cost regardless of whether
the decision variables (prices or yuantities) are strategic substitutes or complements (see
Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)). We further assume that a firm's profit in
the market game is decreasing in its own marginal cost.
Lc~t uÁ(D) be the equilibrium profit of domestic firrn i in a market garne where the
multinational has invested and produces in country A, where D:- (D~, Dzi ..., Dm) is
a vector of environmental parameters representing demand and cost conditions. The
corresponding profit of the multinational is vB(D).
If the multinationa( produces at home in country B, it gets a profit of uB(D, t), where
t is the tariff levied by the government of country A and BuB~ót G 0. We think of t as
directly affecting the marginal cost oí production in country B. The wealth of consumers
is finite, so for auy 0 there is some l(D) such that uB(D, t(0)) - 0. Under the same
cirrumst.:mc~rs dumostic finn i get. a profit of uA(D,t), whcrc ~3u~~~)t ) 0.
'Co makc~ t.he mode~l intc,rcatint;, wc. furthcr :~sswne t.hat in thc case of no protection,
tóc~ n~ul;.iuational woulcl prcdi~r c~xpurting Lo direct investment, i. c. v~(D) G uB(D,0) aud
u;c(D,0) ? vÁ(D) for all D and i.
A strategy for the country A goverument is, sitnply, a tarifC l. A strategy for the
multinational is a function that specifies a choice of production site for every possible value
of t. It is now easily seen that there is a unique tariff level that makes the multinational
indi(fercnt u tu whem to lucatc~ production. 'fhat is, for all D thcrc exists a uniquc
C(D) E (O,t(D)) such that
ue(D,t`(D)) - ua(D). (1)fi
~1'r~ ~~~ill rrd~~r l~~ I' :rs t.ho lilnit. LarilLl "I'hr~ upt.inlal a.ratr~hy of t.hr tnultinal.ional is t.hen
easily cllaracterizecl.
Lentma 1:ln optimal .itratcgy Jor lhe multinalionat prescribes production in country B
if 1 G 1'(D) and pradnction in counlry A if t~ l'(D).
Behavior at t- t'(D) is dealt with in our key proposition.s
Proposition 1 There is a unique subgame perject Nash equilibrium such that t- t'(D)
and the multinationat produces in country B ijt G t`(D) and in country A otherwise.
PROOF. To see that this is an equilibrium, note that at t'(D) the multinational is indif-
ferent between producing in country A and producing in country B, and might as well
produce in country B. As for the domestic firms, if t G t`(D), the profit of each do-
mestic firm can be increased by increasing t. If t ~ t'(D) the multinational will produce
in country A, lowering the profit of each domestic firm. To see that the equilibrium is
unique, consider a situation in which the multinational does something different. From
Lemma 1 we know we need only consider different behavior at the limit tariff. Suppose
thc, nwll.inatiuual procluces in rountry A at t- t'(D) aud otherwise optimally. Then the
tari(f-sc,ttcr in fact fails to havc a best reply. Ile must set l G t'(D), but for auy such l
there exists c) 0 such that t f e yields a higher profit for every domestic firm. But given
that in an equilibrium the multinational must behave as specified in the proposition, the
tariff-setter has a unique best reply at t- t'(D). Subgame perfectness follows from the
assumption that equilibria are played at the market game stage. o
W~, may now do comparativc statics on the equilibrium tariff by totally differentiat-
ing (1). We find that
at'(D) - at,B(D)~aD, - auB(D, t`(B))~ae,
aD~ auB(D, t`(D))~at
for alt j- 1, .. ., m. (2)
which is positive (negative) as avB(D)~aD, is less than (greater than) auB(D, t'(D, k))~aD~.
In words, the limit tariff increases in a given parameter if and only if the impact of that
41n the inJustrial urganizatiou literature a limit price refers to the highest price an incumbent finn
cau rhnrgr withuut rnrouraging rntry.
"It is coinnron in uconornics tn sprci(y tie-brcaking behavior (players' action when they are inJi(ferent)
:m. :~ ndr ~~1' 16~~ I;anu~ Il~~n~, w~. Gdb~w Ih," .~dv~~~- ~d ti~nu~u :~ud "L:urn~ (I!I!111) :~nd Lrr:rt Ln~ Ln-:rkinr; :~.~
part of thc .votuhun.parameter on vB is greater (more positive or less negative) than on uB. Suppose for the
moment that marginal costs are constant. Then, comparative statics with respect to cost
paramPters are straightfonvard.
Yroposition 2 7'hc cquiliLriwn luri,(j is incrcasiny (rlccreasiny) in lhe multinalional's
cosf of proáuction in countr~ A(B).
PROOF. (i) Let Bk be a fixed cost of setting up production in country A. Then avB(B)~aBk -
-1 and auB(tI, t"(B))~at7~ - 0, so by (2) we have that at'(e)~aek -- 1~(auB(6, t~(B))~at) ,
0. (ii) We have assumed that firms' profit is decreasing in own marginal cost. Thus, if Bm is
the marginal cost of the multinational's production in country A, we have avB(B)~aBm C 0
and auB(l7, t'(B))~aBk - 0, with the same conclusion as above. The comparative statics
with respect to the cost of production in country A are analogous. O
The intuition is very simple. If the multinational's production costs increase in coun-
try A relative to country B, FDI becomes less attractive, and the limit tariff must go
up. Hence, Proposition 2 presents a rationale for the common observation that industries
which face high domestic factor prices (or low domestic factor quality) receive more pro-
tection (see in particular Ray (1981) and Marvel and Ray (1983)). Proposition 2 should
be contrasted with the resnlts of Dixit ( 1988). His model has imperfect competition, but
uo dircrt iuvostment, and hr~ :LSUnn~s tliat thc gaw,rnmr,nL tnaximir,rs thr~ sum of domcstic
profit and consumers' surplus. For a given production subsidy, there is then a neyative
relationship between the domestic firm's marginal cost and the optimal level of the tariff
(see Dixit's equation (26)). (Further contrasts between our work and that of others are
highlíghted in section 6.)
We note that the possible solutions of our model depend crucially on how the cost
of producing in country A relates to that of producing in country B. One could think
of set-ups different from the assumptions used above. Let CB(q) be the multinational's
total cost of producing q units in country A, and CB(q) the total cost of producing in
country B. To reduce the potentially very complex spectrum of possibilities, consider just
the cases where the cost functions are affinely related. That is, let CB(q) - k f dCe(q)8
for somc constants k and d. Wc distinguish four cases as follows.
k~0 kc0
d ~ l I tI
d ~ 1 [II IV
In case I, the. marginal cost. of producing in country A is lower than in country B, but
th~~n~ i. a pusil.ivr li~c~~l rua cli(fc,mul.ial. 'I'his ~~asc~ is Lhc, ouc~ clisc~ussccl above ancl tóc~
main (ocus of our atteution. In particular, we studied the case where, in the absence of
protection, thc multinal,ional produces in its home country. This set of parameters also
accords well with our general idea about cost conditions. Set-up costs are lower in the
horne country, because that is where the firm's top management is, so that coordination
and planning is easier. Also, there may be synergies with other production. So, k~ 0.
On the other hand, transportation costs are reduced through FDI, and therefore d G 1.
(A fuller discussion of typical cost parameters facing the multinational firm can be found
in Caves ( 1982).)
For completeness, Ir.t us brie(1y examine the outcomes in cases II to IV. In case [I,
the rnultinational will always invest in country A. This is undesirable for domestic firms,
since the multinational's marginal cost is then lower than it would be if it produced at
home. In case III, the multinational will always produce at home and export. Finally, in
case [V, one can show that in equilibrium there will be FDI, desired by domestic firms.
Here, the multinational [aces a low set-up cost but a high marginal cost in countty A,
and so iL will be less aggressive after an FDI than under any tariff keeping production in
country B. Arguably, this case is rare. In confronting our theory with individual cases,
it, is uevorl.helcss inrporl.:cnt Lo c~hcck Lhat cost parameters conform to case I, rather than
any of the uthers.
3 Business Cycles and Protection
It is a widespread notion that it is easier for a declining industry to obtain protection
than it is (or a prospering one. The phenomenon has been given the label "senile industry
protection." Conventional wisdom suggests that recessions work in the same direction.9
Protection levels increase w}ten times are bad. We substantiate this contention by con-
sidering the effect of demand shifts on the limit tariff.
Sul~poso nuw that thc~ d(,manrl for t.h(~ indust.ry's prodnct. incr(~ases. intuit,ively, this
shuuld incr(~ase~ thr prulir assuciated with lucatiug iu couutry A relative to exporting.
'1'h(~ highe~r fixe~d cost nu~ans less relative to the lower marginal cost as the markca grows
larger. Cousequently, as secn from (2), the limit tariff falls. We have been unable to prove
this assertion at the level of generality of the previous section. Instead, we shall confirm
the intuition in the special context of the linear duopoly model of Dixit (1979). While
this model makes fairly strong assumptions about demand and cost conditions, it has the
attractive feature that it permits analysis of both price and quantity competition. This
allows us to show that the result is independent of the mode of market interaction.
3.1 The Linear Duopoly Model
We briefly recapture a model originating with Dixit (1979) and ïurther analyzed in Singh
and Vives (198a).~
The inverse demand functions are
Pn - a - 1~9n - 79a (3)
and
Pe - a - Q9e - 79n, (4)
where p denotes price, q denotes quantity and a,A, ry are parameters. Direct demand
functions can then be written
rl.t - (! - ~1pA ~- Cpy (r~)
alld
9a - u - bpe -~ cpn, (6)
where a - a(Q - ry)~b, 6- Q~b, c- ry~b, and b- QZ - ry~. For the model to have
interesting solutions, we assume that a 1 0, ~3 1 0, ry~ 0, (i - ry? 0. The condition y~ 0
implies that the products are substitutes. The multinational's fixed costs, denoted ,lB is
eiSingh anJ Viv~,. work wil.h prirrs n~~t of w:vtiinal rost., wl~il,~ nuvgina! rosl. ;epp~.an ~~xplieitly in our
expressions. 'Cl~is accouuts for tho discrrpancics b,~twr~,n our formul;w nnd t.ln~irs.lo
assumeci to be higher if it invests in country A, i. e. k:- kÁ - k8 ~ 0. Marginal costs,
dc,nrited rrrr, :uc, :uscunrd tu be consl.aut.. To savc notation, wr~ includc thc tarift' in Lhe
margiual cost. whenevPr the multinat.ional produces in country B, so that
r)t y : -
mB if production in country A
naB } t if production in country B.
We uow cutnpute the IimiL Lari(I' for eacli kind of market interaction, and perforrn com-
parative statics with respect to a, the market demand parameter.
3.2 Quantity Competition
When quantity is the strategic variable, firm A chooses q,r to maximize its profit
~A :- (a - Q4a t 79B - mA)9A,
and the multinational ( firm B) solves the symmetric problem. The solution is
a(2Q - ry) - 2QmA f ymB
4á - 4ps - yz
and
rc('~~i ...
1) -' ~~iwrrr } yrnA
YH - {~t - 71 .
(7)
(g)
Inserting back into the inverse demand functions, we find that the equilibrium prices can
be expressed as
p`~ :- ;3qf -F mr, for I E{A,B}.
The maximized profit is
~i :- (Pt - mt)9i - k1 - (9i)~ - ki.
(9)
It can easily be checked that the equilibrium is unique and stable, and that a~ is decreasing
in m~. Then Proposition 1 applies, and there is a limit tariff t". The equilibrium quantity
depends on where the multinational produces, and we are particularly interested in the
equilibrium quantities at the limit tariff. Thus, it is convenient to define
?á :-'!ê(mé)11
and
9é :- 9á(mé f t`).
'I'he~ lintit Larilf i~ implic~d by thr, t~qu:rl.íuu
(qé)j - (qé)z - k. (10)
"1'ut.al dilfc~rt,utiatiuu yic~lds
dt' 9á(a4é~aa) - 9é(a9e~aa)
da - 9á(a9é~at)
Signing this expression is straightforward.
Proposition 3 Under quantity competition, lhe (imit tariff is decreasing in the demand
parnrrtrtrrrr.
Plttx)F. "Chc deuoutiuator uf (11) is ncgativc, sincc firm El's equilibrium output is positive
and decreasing in mB, as seen from equation (S). Consider the numerator of (11). Notice
from (8) that BqB~óa does not depend on mB. Hence, 8qB~8a - 8qB~8a ~ 0. Thus, the
numerator has the sign of qB - qB. Since mB ~ f' ~ mB, the numerator is positive. O
3.3 Price Competition
Price competition is stucíied analogously. Now, firm A sets pA to maximize
~n -- (Pa - mA)(a - bpn f cpe)
and firm !J sulves Lhc syrnmetric problem. Thc equililrrium prices arc
a(2b t c) {- 262mA -~ bcme
Pn - - 9b~ - c~
and
a(26 ~ c) f 262mB f Lcm,c
PH ~- - 46! - r~ ~
(12)
(13)
Inse~rtint; hark intu Llu~ drtnand t~quat.ions, t.he~ c~quilibriutn ttuantil.ics can br. cxpmsst~d :4ti
qí - 6(Pf - mr).
The maxirnized profit for firm 1 is then
r~ - li(tr~ - ntl)~ - Á~t.
(14)12
Again, the equilibriwn is unique and stable and a limit tariff exists. Define r as the price
net of e(Fective marginal cost, evaluated at the limit tariff. We say that




ré :- Pe(mé f t~) - mé - t'.
Hencr, Lhe equilibrium tariff t` solves
6(ré)~ - b(ré)~ - k.
7ii study how t` rcacts to a slrifl. in rt, we difFerentiate this equation to get
dt' rB(órBlBa) - rB(BrBlr~a)
da - rB(BrBIr3t) .
The sign of this expression is our next result.
(17)
Proposition 4 Under price r.ompetition, the equiliórium tarijj is a decreasing junction
oj demand.
PROOF. From ( 13) we cau compute the size of the denominator:
BrBldt - 8pá(mé -}- t')I óm8 - 1 -(c2 - 26~)I(4b~ - cZ).
Since G ~ c(by the assumption that ,Q ~ y), this expression is negative.
Cunsidcr now thc numerator. From (13) we see that
~Pé (26 f c)(Q - 7)
8(Y - -(S(`tt)1 - r.á) .
whirh is pu.it.ie~~ :md iudr,p~~ndr~ut uf rnti. Iionc~, i)ry~r)rr - ~)rN~í)rr ~ 0.
Wi. óave just cstablished Lhat r)rBldmy c 1. We know that mB f l 1 mB, and hence
ry ~ ry. It follows that the numerator is positive. p
T}iis co~npletes the demonstration that t' varies countercyclically regardless of the
mode of market interaction.13
4 Tariff versus Non-Tariff Protection
So (ar, Larilis havc~ been thr only moans of protcction considr,red. 1}uwcvcr, the ~nodcl
suggests a rcason why tari(fs and quotas are not equivalent from the point of view of the
domestic industry. The idea is that a quot.a can limit the imports while extracting less
rcut Go~n Lhr foreigu lirui. ('un,i~yuruLl}', th,~ yuuL:r r:u~ be set aL a luwcr Icvcl thun thc
imports implied by the IimiL tariff, without attracting foreign direct investment.
Again, the argument is quite general and can be substantiated in a variety ofoligopoly
mo~lr~ls. I~ur simplirity, wr~ ronsi~ler only Lhe duopoly case.
Suppose the government in country A can set a quota, qB, together with a quota
license fee, 1 1 0. The license fee, as well as any tariff proceeds, will remain with the
governmeut..'
While the quantity competition case is actually easier to analyae with quotas instead
of tariffs, price competition becomes slightly more complex. The reason is that for some
pairs of prices there is an excess demand for the multinational's product. We therefore
need to specify how sales are distributed in the case of shortage, i. e. a rationing assump-
tion. Here, we follow Krishna (1989) and adopt the assumption that rationing is efficient:
The foreign good is allocated to those with the highest willingness to pay. (This alloca-
tion would automatically come about if arbitrage were costless.) With this assumption,
ratiuned buyrn an~ olforl.iv~~ly fa~ ~,d wil.h thr ni:u ket i h,aring pri~ c fur pru~luc~l. Il i:rthcr
than the price quoted. Hence, the effective demand for the domestic product (for any
given price) is larger the smaller is the quota. 8
Define a"limit quota" qB(t,!) as a quota for which the multinational is indifferent
betwcen exporting and making a direct investment:
ue(4e(t, l), t) - 1- ve, (18)
where ii~ is the maximizetl profit, gross of the (output idependent) license fee, for the
~If proceeds from a quota license fee and~or the tariflwere allocated to the domestic industry, the
results below would no longer hold.
sWhile thc assumption of e(6cient rationing greatly simplifies our analysis, we believe that it is not
crucial to the result. As is shown below, we only need that the Jomestic firm's profit is decreasing in the
size o( the yuota.14
multinational if it chooses to export.s Here we have suppressed B to save notation. In the
following, it should be remembered that all equilibrium values depend on this vector of
environmental paramet.ers.
1`'e r~~ill be interested in thc relationship between the limit quota and thc other two
variables. Differentiation of (18) yields





We now determine the sign ot these expressions. Clearly, auB~at G 0. When the quota
does not bincl, this follows directly from our assumption that profits decrease in own
marginal cost (see section 2). Under a binding quota it is trivial, since the taciff does not
a(fect the quantity of imports, but does extract rent.
Now, what about auB(qy(t,t),t)~dy !n the quantity competition case it is positive
as long as quantities are strategic substitutes. (This is well known. See Tirole (1988), p.
326 for a proof). The positive effect on the equilibrium price never suffices to outweigh
the loss from a lower quantity. With price competition, the expression may be negative
for some interval.rv Consequently, the solution to (18) may not be unique. However, since
uB(0, t, l) - 0 c v, we know that auB~aq ~ 0 at the solution with the smallest quota. As
it turns out, this is the one that we are interested in.
As indicated, the country's trade policy is now a triple (t, l, qB), and our objective is
to characterizc the policy desired by the domestic firm. Notice that a voluntary export
mstraint (VGR) is jnst the special case where the tariff and the license fce are both zero.
Wc am now rcady to present the main result of this section. Let there be competition
in either prices or quantities, and let them be strategic complements and substitutes
respectively.
Proposition 5 A VER is prejerredto any other means ofprotection. That is, lhe optimal
policyJrom the domeslic industry's point oJview is (O,O,qB(0,0)).
dq -1
- -- (20)
9There may be more than one solution to equation (18). Firm A will typically prefer the one with the
lowest quota. We return to this problem below.
roKnshna (IJ89) shows lhal a modest quota restriction may benefit the foreign firm.15
PltooF. The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1: For given t and !, the government
will irnposc thr~ (luwcst) IimiL quota. (i) (2uantity cornpetition: If the quota binds, the
residual demand facing the domestic firm is greater the smaller is the quota, and so it can
sell more at any price '1'be equilibrium profit, 6A, is therefore decreasing in the size of
the quot.a. (ii) Price competition: (For a fuller exposition, see Krishna (1989).) Consider
tho multinational's best response function without a quota. Then impose the quota. For
prices pA such that Lhc quota does not bind, the multinational's best response remains
the same. But when the yuota does bind, py is irrelevant to the quantity sold. In this
case, tho inulLiuatioual ,hould inr reaac its pricr~ up to Lbe Ievel where the quota just does
not bind. Tiiis means that the multinational becomes less aggressive: For any given pA
its best response price is (weakly) higher the smaller is the quota. Since the domestic
firm's profit is increasing in pB, it follows that it prefers the (lowest) limit quota to any
other.
Step 2: Now we show that t- 1- 0. From (19) and (20) we have that dq ~dt and
dQ~dl are both positive (at least at the lowest limit quota). Thus, the limit quota is at
its smallest when both t and ! are zero. p
Notice that the choice of instrument does not affect the equilibrium profit of the
multinational. Regardless of the means of protection it earns v, the profit associated with
dire~r.t investment. This contrasts with the popular opinion that VI;R's necessarily Ieave
a larger rent with foreign producers than other means of protection. While it is true that
(orcigners obtain the~ full rent on each unit sold, the VER allows a smaller volume of
inrports thau any altcrnative Lrade policy.
Although the VGR is the best trade policy for domestic sellers, other domestic in-
terests suffer from thc lack of government revenue. Consequently, these interests should
opposc~ VER's tnorc vigorously thau a tari(L A Lari(f protccts Lhc industry und gcncraLrs
revcnue, as does a traded yuota. A VER only protects the industry. A reasonable hypoth-
esis is therefore that VER's should be more strongly correlated with industry subsidies
and rneasures of political influence than other means of protection.16
5 Equilibrium Foreign Direct Investment
:1 prohlem with t.he currc~nt mode) specification is that it seerns to accord badly with some
famous case histories.
As argued in the introduction, Japanese car manufacturers made heavy U. S. invest-
ments only aíter the protectionist policies initiated by the American car industry. Also,
Japanese producers of color TV's built U. S. manufacturing plants as a response to a VER
initiatcd by the Amcrican electronics industry (ser, Gordon and Lec~s (1986) and Graham
and Krugman (1991) for more details about these and other cases). But the way the
model is specified above, the U. 5. industry would only ask for such a high level of protec-
tion if it actually desired foreign investment. According to several commentators this was
not. .u, huwcvcr. As t.bo Ncw York 'f'imcs quotc in Lhc introductiun shows, obscrvcn carly
realized that the Japanese would be more competitive once they built their transplants.
We must conclude either that the U. S. industry was plainly stupid in asking for increased
protoction (thcy nuw facc nwrc aggressivc rompetit.ion than thcy wuuld have done in the
absence of Japanese direct investment), or that they did not have accurate information.
Below, we explore the latter possibility.
It is clearly unrealistic that the domestic industry knows the costs of the foreign
producer with certainty. We shall now show that asymmetric infotmation about cost may
generate direct investment along the equilibrium path with positive probability. In other
words, the domestic industry may be willing to trade off a higher profit in the case of no
FDI against a positive probability of FDI.
To makc thc analysis as simple as possible, we assume that only the multinational's
fixcd costs arc unknown to the dotnestic industry. Let k, the difference in fixed cost be-
twe~~n production in rountrics A and !3, be a random variable with the continuous and
~lilfcrcntialrlc ~lí,t.rihul.iun I-'(k,.,) on Lbc intrrval (k(..), k(s)~, whcrc n is a shift p:u:unctcr.
Thr corresponding density function is denoted f(k, s). As a convention, let F be decreas-
ing in s. In other words, au increase in s means that the distribution over k moves to the
right.
It is convenient to work with profits net of the common fixed cost element. Hence, a
multinational of type k has payo(f vy-k if it produces in country A, and uB(t) otherwise.17
Recall tliat the equilibrium of the market game is independent of k. Like in the previous
section, we suppress B(which should now be interpreted as all parameters except fixed
cost ) in order to save notation. (All results are valid for an arbitrary vector of parameters,
as long as the market game satisfies the general conditions imposed in section 2.) Then,
for each k tlie.re is t"(k) such that
ttp(t`(k)) - T~8 - k.
As before, if t G t'(k), the multinational produces in E3. If t 1 t'(k), it produces in A.
Define
K(t) :- vB - uB(t).
The probability that the multinational produces in A when the tariff is equal to t can
then be written
G(t, s) :- F(x(t), s). (21)
The associated density function is denoted g(t, s). For simplicity we assume that there is
only one domestic firm. Its expected profit is
eA(t, s) :- C(t, s)vA t(1 - C(t, s))uA(t). (22)
It is easily seen that eA(t, s) is continuous and right-differentiable at t'(k(s)). Let t~`(s)
denote the tariff that maximizes expected profit. If t~(s) E[t'(k(s)), t'(k(s))~, there will
be a positive probability that the multinational chooses to produce in country A in equi-
librin~n. (9~,arl~., :c sn(fir i~,nt ~ uu~Iition for this to hr Lhr rasc~ is t.li:~t í)rn(t'(k(.ti)))~r~l ~ 0.
UiIG~n~nl.ial.in}; (~:S). Llii4 ~un~liliun ~an br~ wiitl~.n
unn(t'(A))
at ' (t`A(t~(~(S))) - vA)g(t'(~(s))). (2s)
This inequality has a natural interpretation. Foreign direct investment may occur in equi-
librium ií, when the tariff is set at t`(k(s)), (i) the domestic firm has much to gain from an
increase in the multinational's marginal cost (8uA(t'(k(s)))~ót is large), (ii) the domestic
firm has little to lose from direct investment by the multinational (u~(t'(~l(s))) - v~ is
small), ancl (iii) an increase in the tariff above t'(k(s)) only leads to a small probability
of direct investment (g(t'(!~(s))) is small). The last factor can alternatively be written
g(t`(k(S))) - -I(k(s))
8uB(C(~:(s)))
- - at ~18
In words, the probability of direct investment increases slowly with the tariff in this region
if k is considered unlikely to assume values close to k(s) or if a change in protection has
a small impact on the multinational's profit.
A simple example where FDI occurs with positive probability is when the multi-
national's marginal cost is independent of location ( mB - mB), and k(s) - 0. Here,
auy positive tarifl' induces Flll witó positive probability, so L`(k(s)) - 0. Conseyuently,
nA(1"(k(.))) - ~A - 0, and the right hand side of (23) is zero. Since the left hand side is
stricLly positive Uy assumption, the condition is satisfied.
Do our comparative statics survive the introduction of uncertainty? To answer this
question, we need to consider a shift in F, the distribution of the multinational's fixed
cost. If a positive shift results in a higher level of protection, we have an analog to
Proposition 2. Obviously, the relationship always holds for parameter values such that
t"(s) - t'(k(s)), for which the probability of FDI is zero. To study the case in which
G(t~(s),s) ) 0, maximize (22). The first order condition is
1(t..(..),.,)(u,, - nA(~' , ~ Bt~A(t,.(S))
~Í~ ))) ~t - (I - C,(t""(s),s)) - 0. (24)
The first term is the expected cost of increasing the tariff, viz. the increase in probability
of FDI multiplied by the difference in profit. The second term denotes the corresponding
gain, which is the probability that the multinational will continue to export multiplied by
the increase in firm A's profit. The second order condition can be written






.(~~.4 - IlA(t..(.v))) - Z ~t ---.f~(t..l.ti),S)
} 8~un(t..(s))(1
- G t' s,s l dt~ ( ' ( ) )).
Dif[erentiating in (24), we can characterize the tariff's dependence on s as follows;
- t
Órf( ~ t"(s),s) - 8G( t~(s),s) 8llA( ~-~))
dt"~(s) - - ÓS (vA - u,l(t~(s))) - ÓS Ót
ds - h(t"(s),s) ~
(26)19
Thus the only term which may have an ambiguous sign is ag(t"(s), s)~as. From (21) we
know that
sgn ~ag(t,s)1 - sgn raf(k,s)1
. as J l as J
Hence, a su,~cient condition for t"(s) to be increasing in s is that
at(K(t~(S)),3) ~ o. as -
For a uniform distribution, this condition holds with equality. For any single-peaked
density function f, with a peak at k(s), it holds if and only if K(t~(s)) G k(s). (If the
distribution is symmetric, this means that the probability of FDI, G(t"(s),s), must be
less thau t~l.)
Nr~rv:vsuy r'onrlil.ions arr hanlr~r to inLr~rprr-t.. Wr, r'annot r~ornplctrly rlist-arrl thr
possibility that there are distributions such that rtt"~ds is negative over an interval.'t We
conclude that a perfect analog to Proposition 2 may not exist for all possible distribution
functions F and paramrtrrs 0. Whether a counterexample can be found remains to be
seen, however.
Above, the probability of FDI and the level of protection are jointly determined. So,
whereas a given firm is more likely to invest the higher is the level of protection, we cannot
draw the conclusion that investment and protection should be positively correlated as long
as both variables are affected by the distribution of k. Indeed, there is a case to be made
that there should be a negative relationship instead. The intuition is simple: As the cost
difference k increases, firm A can exploit the situation in two ways. It can keep the tariff
and benefit from the probability of direct investment going down, or it can increase the
tariff. But the higher the tariff, the more the domestic firm has to lose from FDI, and
hence it should be more cautious (wish for a lower G) as k is higher. Formally, we can
show Lhc following result.
Proposit.ion 6 hr rquiliLrium, lhr proLulitlilg nf forciyn rlirrrl im,r,,hrtrnl is drr~rrvr,tiiny
ln 5.
~rThe intuition is the (ollowing. Consider a solution in which K(t~(s)) ~ k(s). 1( s goes up, the
decrease in probability of FDI irom a marginal reduction in t is greater than beforc, and it may there(orc
be profitable lo lower l.20
PROOF: The result is obtained by total differentiation of the first order condition (equa-
tion (24)). Rearranging terms, substituting in from the first order condition and dividing
by auA(t~(s))~at, we find
dc(t"(s), s) - dt" ag(t"(s), s)
ds ds h( tTM(s)'s) } as (vA - t~q(t~(s))).
"1'his can be further simplificd using equation (26), to obtain
dc(t"(s),s) - ac(t~(s),s)auA(t~(s))
ds - as at '
wliiró ix n,~};al.ivo. p
Tho corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 !j there is n positive relationship óetween t~ and s, then there is a negalive
ndatiouship bchorcn C ~nrd t".
In other words, if industries di(fer only in their cost of direct investment (the distribution
of k), and if Lrade policy is in the hands of the domestic industry, tlrere would typically
be a negative correlation between protection and direct investment. This result may shed
light on a challenging empirical finding by Orr (1975). In a cross-section sample, he found
no significant relationship between Canadian tariffs and the ratio of direct investment over
imports. The coefficient, however, was negative -quite contrazy to the received theory.
That theory, developed by Horst (1971,1972) among others, was one in which protection
was exogenous and consequently predicted a positive correlation between protection and
FDI.
To summarize the section, the introduction of asymmetric information allows foreign
direct investrnent in equilibrium even when firms have rational expectations. Thus, the
nol.ion that the VLR's lobbied for by the American electronics and car industries triggered
dimrt investment by Japanesc firms, is not evidence that the lobbying was irrational or
that the American industry stood to gain from the presence of transplants. The more
compelling story is that they behaved rationally given their beliefs, but underestimated
thi~ a~laptability of tha Japanesc technology.
Moreover, the relationship between protection and direct investment changes sign if
protection levels are endogenously rather than exogenously determined.11
6 Related Literature
The paper brings together two previously separate strands of literature. The theory of
endogenuus trade policy is extended to allow for direct investrnent as a substitute for
trade, and the theory of multinational firms is extended to take account of endogenous
trade policy. Below, we relate our work to earlier contributions.
Mundell (195ï) is an early article discussing the relationship between trade in com-
modities and factor movements. In particular, he showed formally that "an increase in
tradc~ impc.dinx,uts stimulatcs factor movenrents and an incrc:uc in factor movements
stimulates trade.n He also demonstrated the possibility of using high tariffs to attract
capital.
Whilc, Mwrclc~ll's analysis is carric~d uut. in a:r world of perk~c~t comprtition, the~
prescnt paper relies heavily ou t.he assu[nptious thaL markets are imperfect, and that a
mull.inat.ional firm has a technological advantage which is transferable across countries.
TI[is theory of the multinational corporation originated with Hymer (1960) and is now
broadly accepted. [n this tradition, an early formalization is Horst (1971) who analyzes
the connection between tariffs and the behavior of a multinational monopoly. He did
however not try to explain the level of tariffs.
In thr, normative trade thcory, there has been a number of attempts to assess the
welfare consequences of import tariffs in a framework with imperfect competition. The
seminal article is Brander and Spencer (1984). Dixit (1988) generalizes their analysis and
derives a number of comparative static results. As Dixit (p.68) himself concludes, the
results are not ronsistent with the practices we observe, and he argues that "political
necessity" must he~ tbe~ main explanation. Roc-ontly, thc~ Branclor~Spc,nrer framework has
bcrn c~xtc~ndc~cl to allow for ~lircc.t rnvcstmcnt :rs ;tn altc~rnativc tu tradc, in papcrs by
Horstrnan and Markusen (1992) and Motta (1992). They consider the impact of tari(fs
on the choice between exporting and making a direct investment in an imperfectly com-
petitive [narket. They show that there is a complex relationship between the parameters
of the model and the welfare maximizing tariff. The complexity is due to the (act tbat
the interest of domestic consumers (low prices) is contrary to the interest of domesticz2
produrf,r..12 In addition, thesf~ papf~rs only consider quantity cotnpetition, and would
surely display even more complexity if the tnode of market interaction were considered as
we11.13 Thus, if one were to argue that governments in fact try to maximize the sum of
profit and consumers' surplus, these papers -like Dixit (1987)-are bad news.
The present paper, while maintaining the assumption that markets are imperfectly
competitive, assumes that the government cares chieHy about industry profit and neglects
the interest of poorly organized consumers. As we have shown, the model is then capable
of delivering simple predictions which do not depend on details of the market interaction.
As indicated above, the positive theory of protection has largely ignored the pos-
sibility of direct investment. An exception is the theory of quid pro quo foreign direct
investment, as formulated by Bhagwati in a series of papers (see e. g. Bhagwati (1987)).
1'here, thf~ idea is that firms may maki~ direct investments abroad to influence the foreign
country Lo reduf'f~ protc~ctiun. 'I'hal. fr.nnf~work is vrry di(fcrent from unrs, as it rests on the.
beneficial e(fects of FUI on the host cowltry's economy." The government in Bhagwati's
story does not primarily listen to thc multinational's domestic competitors.
The idea that declining industries are less susceptible to new entry and therefore may
desire higher tariffs can be found in Baldwin (1982, 270-271). He argues that lobbying by
incumbent firms generates a positive externality on future entrants, creating a free-rider
proble~n that is absent if thc industry is decliuiug aud no ncw cntry will take place.~5
However, he did not notice that the incurnbents may even prefer a low tariff, which is the
key to our results.
While there have been several different explanations for the choice of quotas over
I~In 111otta's nwdcl f~omplications also ariw~ from thc cndogcncity of thc domrxLir finn's entry 111'cIS1U11.
I~As is now well known, stratcgic trade tluwry is riddled by results that depend on wllether lhe firms'
ehoice variablcs are strategk complemrnts or strategir substitutes. Sew, e. g., Krugman ( IDOII, rh.l4) for
an overview.
I~Indeed, we have ignored all beneficial e(fects of FUI for the host country. Countries sometimtsset high
tazifl's exactly in order to attract foreign entrants-notably large multinational corporations. However,
this is the case mainly when local competition is weak or missing-not least in developing countries. Our
theory is applicable only when there is a domestic industry to protect.
IsHillman (1982, 1182) also notes that declining industries are less susceptible toentry, but in his model
this is not the basic reason they rcceivc morc protcction.23
tariffs,1ó the literature on VEIt's usually assumes a rationale for leaving rents with for-
eigners, either because multinationals can influence domestic politicians as in Hillman
and Ursprung (1988), or because oí fears of retaliation if foreign interests aze harmed
too much. In the current paper on the other hand, multinationals do not care about the
type of protection, since their equilibrium profit is unaffected. The lower tariff is exactly
counterbalanced by the smaller size of the quota. Thus, the analysis ties in with that of
E3hagwati and Brecher (198ï), who also question whether a VER is pre(erable to other
import restrictions seen from the foreign country's point of view.t~
Finally, section 4 relates to Levinsohn (1989), who studies a model with endogenous
location in which a country can choose whether to impose a taziff or a quota. His main
result is that the two are equally effective. Levinsohn's model differs from ours in two
important respects, however. His government maximizes welfare rather than domestic
profit. Also, there are no fixed costs, so the foreign firm can costlessly split its production
between countries.
7 Final Remarks
Previons work on endogenous protection has largely supposed that the domestic industry
wants unlimitcd protection. In a world where a large proportion of all protluction is carried
out by multinational corporations, this is a questionable assumption. To the domestic
industry, the risk of facing competition from transplants is a real cost of import protection.
In the present paper, therefore, we model the trade-off between import protection and
the risk of FDI.
The model provides a new explanation for several observed regularities, and in paz-
ticular the correlations between protection on one hand and cost and demand conditions
on the other.
Future empirical work may show whether the theory stands up to more tailor made
rfiNotably, thc social cost of quot:w is Ictic trausparent than that of tariffs; see Feeustra (1J84), the
yuota rent can be rnore easily ascigned to domestic industry interests; see Cassing and Ilillman (1985),
and yuolas may facilitate collusion; see Krishna (1rJ89).
r~ln the Dhagwati and Brecher paper, it is general equílibrium elfects and costly lobbying that are thc
sources of (oreign rent dissipation.24
tests as well. The most obvious test is to compare industries with much firm specific capital
and easy technology transfer to industries where there is little firm specific capital and~or
where such capital is hard to utilize abroad. (The first group of industries contains, e. g.,
products where trademazks are more important than the actual production technology.)
The latter should have systematically higher protection.
We emphasize that the theory does not only apply to industries in which multinational
i
firms are curreutly active, as the activity is au endogenous feature of an equilibrium.
Consider the example of agriculture. This is an industry with little firm-specific knowledge
and almost exclusively domestic investment; it is as if k is infinitely large. According to
our model, a country's agricultural protection should therefore be comprehensive in all
products where there is domestic production. Certainly, the high worldwide levels of
agricultural protection is consistent with the present theory.18
Of course, the paper neglects several potentially important factors. We do not wish
to deny that labor unions have political influence or that multinational firms are capable
of exerting pressure in a foreign country. These are factors which, if introduced into the
model, may moderate our conclusions, but not we believe, undermine the framework.
An implicit assumption has been that the domestic industry cannot seek protection
against FD1. This is unrealistic. Many countries have long traditions in preventing for-
eigners from investing in domestic production facilities. The insistence by the U. S. auto
industry on various domestic content rules can also be explained as a way of making direct
investment more costly to Japanese car makers. In the future it would be desirable to
study the interaction between barriers to trade and barriers to investment.
One reason why it is harder to erect barriers to investment than to trade, is that
rrRions and r~unnt.riox m;ry hc, plavc~J aRainst r~arh ol.hr,r hy thr~ mnll.inat.innal finn. 1:. K.,
even iC the U. S. car industry as such was opposed to Japanese investments, a number of
states were competing (or their investment once it was clear that they moved in.'s This
~dSe.veral countries forbid imports of various foreign agricultural products perrnanently or during thr
domestic season. On the other hand, average agricultural protection is very low in some other countries,
including the United States. This can be explained, however, by the superior efliciency of domestic (arms.
In the U. S.,for instance, protection is hardly needed to keep out foreign grain or beef.
'sFteportedly, the state of Kentucky lured Toyota to establish a plant there by promising free land, 347
million in new roads and a training program worth 365 million (see Graham and Krugman (1991)).25
issue, as wcll as thc. is,ui~ uf tradiug blocs,~u require an extensíon of the model to include
more than one host region. That, however, must await future work.
~o'1}ading bloca raises a number oC new questions, such as trade diversion within and betwcen blocs,
industry flight, and other conflicts oCinterest.26
References
BAt.DwIN, RUBERT E. (19Z32): 'Che Political Economy of Protectionism. In Jagdish N
Bhag~cati (ed.): Imporl Compelition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
BALDWIN, RoUERT E. (1985): Thc Political Economy oJ U. S. Import Policy. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
B}IAGWATI, JACDISI[ N. (1987): VERs, Quid Pro Quo DFI, and VIEs: Political Econ-
orny Theoretic Analyses. International Economic Journal, 1, 1-14.
BHAGWATI, JAGDISH N. AND RICHARD A. BRECHER (1987): VoluntaryExport Restric-
tions versus Import Restrictions: A Welfare Theoretic Comparison. In Henryk
Kir-rzkuw,ki (ed.) Protrclion and Compctilion in Intcrnatioual Tradr.. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
BRANDEN, JAMES A. AND BARDARA J. SPENCER (1984): Tariff Protection and Im-
períect Competition. [n Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.): Monopolistic Competition in
International Trade, Ox[ord: Oxford University Press.
BULOW, JEREntv I., JOIIN D. GEANAKOYLOS AND PAUL D. I{LEMPERER (1985): Mul-
timarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements. Journa! oj Politica!
Economy, 93, 488-511.
CASSING, JAMES H. AND ARYE L. HILLMAN (1985): Political-Infiuence Motives and
the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas. Journal of International Economics,l9,
279-290.
CAVES, RICIIARD E. (1976): Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff
Structure. Canadian Journa! oj Economics, 9, 278-300.
CAVES, RICIIARD E. (198'l): Multirrational Enterprise and Econornic Analysis. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
DIxIT, AvINASH I~. (1979): A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers,
13c11 Journal oj Er.onornics, 10, 20-:T2.DIXIT, Av[NASH K. (1986): Comparative Statics for Oligopoly. Economic Journal, 27,
l0ï 13'?.
DIxIT. AvINASH K. (1958):Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties under Oligopoly.
European Economic Review, 32, 55-68.
FEENSTRA, ROBERT C. (1984): Voluntary Export R.estraints in U. S. Autos 1980-81:
Quality, Employment and Welfare Effects, In R.obert E. Baldwin and Anne O.
Krueger (eds.): The Structure and F,volution ojRecent U. S. Trade Policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
GORDON, SARA L. AND FRANCIS A. LEES (1986): Foreign Multinational Investment
in the United States. New York: Quorum Books.
GRAIIAM, EDwARD M. AND PAUL R. KRUGMAN (1991): Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States. Washingtore [nstitute for International Economics.
HILLMAN, AItYE L. ( 1982): Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Poli-
cies. Amerícnn Economic Review, 72, 1180-1187.
HILLMAN, Attvt: L. (1989): The Political Economy nf Protcction. Chur: Harwood Aca-
demic Publishers.
HILLMAN, ARYE L. AND HEINRICH URSPRUNG (1988): Domestic Politics, Foreign In-
terests and International Trade Policy. American Economic Review, 78, 729-745.
HoRST, TtlOMAS (1971): The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behavior
IJndc~r Diffi~r~~nt Tari(I and Tax Rates. Journal oj Pnlilical Er.onnmy, 79, 1059-1072.
HORST, TnoMAS (1972): 1'he [ndustrial Composition of U.S. Export and Subsidiary
Sales to the Canadian Market. Amcrican Economic Review, G2, 37-45.
HORSTMAN, IGNATIUS J. AND JAMES R. MARKUSEN (1992): Endogenous Market Struc-
tures in International Trade. Journal oj International Economics, 32, 109-129.
HouT, TItoMAS M. (1984): Trade Barriers Won't Keep Out Japan. New York Times,
April 29, D1.z8
HYMER, STEPHEN H. (1960): The lnternational Operations of National Firms. Cam-
bridge Mass: MIT Press, 1976. Originally a PhD thesis at MIT 1960.
I~RISHN,~. ICnLa (1989): Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices. Journal of lnter-
national Economics, 26, 251-270.
LEVINSOHN, JAMES A. (1989): Strategic Trade Policy When Firms Can Invest Abroad:
When are Tariffs and Quotas Equivalent? Journa! of lnternational Economics, 27,
129-146.
Mn[tvEL, HownRD P. .vND EDwnttD J. RnY (1983): The Kennedy Round: Evidence
on the Regulation of International Trade in the U.S. American Economic Review,
73,190-197.
MePHE[tsoN, C. P. (1972): Tariff Structures and Politica! Exchange, Unpublished PhD
thi~sis, lJnivcrsity of Chicago.
Mo't"1'n, MAS51M0 ( l99'l): Multiuatiwial l~inns and thc'1'ari(f Jwnpiug Argument. Forth-
coming in European Economic Review.
MUNDELL, ROBERT A. (1957): International Trade and Factor Mobility. Americnn Eco-
nomic Review, 47, 321-335.
ORR, DALE (1975): The Industrial Composition of U. S. Exports and Subsidiary Sales
to the Canadian Market: Comment. American Economic Review, 65, 230-234.
PtNCUS, JoNATttnN J. (1975): Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs. Journal of
Political Economy, 83, 757-778.
RAY, EDwnRD J. (1981): The Determinants of Tariffs and Nontariff Trade Restrictions
in the U. S. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 105-]21.
SALAMON, LESTER M. AND JOIIN J. SIEGFR[ED (1977): Economic Power and Politi-
cal Influcncc. American Politica! Scicnce Rcview, 71, 1026-1043.
SIMON, LEO K. nNU WILt.InM R. ZnME (1990): Uiscoutinuuus Cames and Endogc-
nous Sharing Rules. Econometrica, 58, 861-872.19
SINGH, NIRVIKAR AND XAVIER VIVES (1984): Price and Quantity Competition in a
DiR'erentiated Oligopoly. Rand Journal oj Economics 15, 546-554.
Tinot,E. .TenN (19i~8): Th~ Thcory oJlnduslrial Organizatiou, Cambridge: MIT Press.Uiscussfon Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg Unlversity, The Netherlands:
(For previous papen please cunxult previous diticussion papers.)
No. Author(s) Title
9141 C. Fershtman and
A.de Zeeuw
9142 J.D. Angrist and
G.W.Imbens
9143 A.K. Bera and
A. Ullah
9144 B. Melenberg and
A. van Soest
9t45 G. Imbens and
T. Lancaster
9146 Th. van de Klundert
;~nd S. Smuldcrs
9147 J. Greenberg
914K S. van Wijnbergen
9149 S. van Wijnhergen







9154 A.K. Bera and
S. Lee
') I55 F. dc Jong
')ISb B. Ic lilanc
9157 A.J.J. Talman
Capital Accumulation and Entry Deterrence: A Clarifying
Note
Sources of Identifying Information in Evaluation Models
Rao's Score Test in Econometrics
Parametric and Semi-Parametric Modelling of Vacation
Expenditures
Efficient Estimation and Stratified Sampling
Reconstructing Growth Theory: A Survey
On the Sensitivity of Von Neuman and Morgenstern Abstract
Stable Sets: The Stable and the Individual Stable Bargaining
Set
Trade Reform, Poliry Uncertainty and the Current Account:
A Non-Expected Utility Approach
Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and the Political
Economy of Price Reform
A Decision Theoretic Analysis of the Unit Root Hypothesis
Using Mixtures of Elliptical Models
Consumer Allocation Models: Choice of Functional Form
Bear Syueezes, Volatility Spillovers and Speculative Attacks
in the Flyperinllatiun 1920s Foreign Gxchangc
Bayesian Inference in Time Series
Information Matrix Test, Parameter Heterogeneity and
ARCH: A Synthesis
A Univariate Analysis ofEMS Exchange Rates Usinga Target
Econumies in Tr:msition
Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex and the
SimplotopeNo. Author(s)
9ISH H. Bester
9159 A. t7zcam, G. Judge,
A. Bera and T. Yancey
9160 R.M.W.J. Beetsma
91G1 A.M. Lejour and
H.A.A. Verbon
9162 S. Bhattacharya
9163 H. Bester, A. de Palma,
W. Leininger, E.-L. von
Thadden and J. Thomas
9164 J. Greenberg
9165 Q.H. Vuong and W. Wang
91G(i D.O. Stahl II
91G7 D.O. Stahl 11
91GA T.E. Nijman and F.C. Palm
9169 G. Asheim
9170 H. Carlsson and
E. van Damme
9201 M. Verheek and
Th. Nijman
~~2112 f;.liomhuff
9203 J. Quiggin and P. Wakker




9207 M. Verbeek and
Th. Nijman
920A W. H~rdle and
A.B. Tsybakov
Title
A Model of Price Advertising and Sales
The Risk Properties of a Pre-Test Estimator for Zellner's
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model
Bands and Statistical Properties of EMS Exchange Rates: A
Monte Carlo Investigation of Three Target Zone Models
Z.one Mcxlel
Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making on Social
Insurance in an Integrated Market
Multilateral Institutions
Sovereign Debt, Creditor-Country Governments, and
The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game
The Stable Value
Selecting Estimated Models Using Chi-Square Statistics
Evolution of Smart, Players
Strategic Advertising and Pricing with Sequential Buyer Search
Recent Developments in Modeling Volatility in Financial Data
Individual and Collective Time Consistency
Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games
Minimum MSE Estim:~tion ofa Regression Model with Fixed
Effects from a Series of Cross Sections
Monetary Pulicy and Inflation
The Axiomatic Basis of Anticipated Utility; A Clarification
Strategies for Growth in a Macroeconomic Setting
Money and Specialization in Production
Applied Nonparametric Models
Incomplete Panels and Selection Bias: A Survey
How Sensitive Are Average Derivatives?No. Author(s)
9209 S. Alh:rk :~nd
P.B. Ch~erg:tard
9210 M. Cripps and
J. Thomas
921 I S. Alhsk
9212 T.1.A. Storcken and
P.H.M. Ruys
9213 R.M.W.J. Beetsma and
F. van der Ploeg
9214 A. van Soest
9215 W. Giith and
K. Ritzberger
921G A. Simonovits
9217 J.-L. Ferreira, 1. Gilboa
and M. Masrhler
')218 P. Borm, H. Keiding,
R. Mclean, S. Oortwijn
and S. Tijs
9219 J.L. Horowitz and
W. Hárdle
9220 A.L. Bovenberg
9221 S. SmuWcrs and
Th. v:m dr Klundert
9222 H. Bester and E. Petrakis
9223 A. van den Nouweland,






Upstream Pricing and Advertising Sign:d Downstream
Demand
Reputation and Commitment in 7rvo-Person Repeated Games
EndogenousTiming in a Game with Incomplete Information
Extensions of Choice Behaviour
Exchange Rate Bands and Optimal Monetary Aocommodation
under a Dirry Float
Discrete Choice Models of Family Labour Supply
On Durable Goods Monopolies and the (Anti-) Coase-
Conjecture
Indexation of Pensions in Hungary: A Simple Cohort Model
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during
the Play
The Compromise Value fur NTU-Games
Testing a Parametric Model against a Semiparametric
Alternative
Investment-Promoting Policies in Open Economies: The
Importance of Intergenerational and International
Distributional Effects
Monopolistic Competition, Product Variety and Growth:
Chamberlin vs. Schumpeter
Price Competition and Advertising in Oligopoly
Monotonic Games are Spanning Network Games
A "Mistaken Theories" Refinement
Rohust Selection of Equilibria
Economically Applicable Evolutionary Games
Four Econometric Fashions and the Kalman Filter
Altrrnative - A Simulation StudyNo. Author(s) Title
9228 P. Borm, G.-J. Otten
and H. Peters
9229 H.G. Bloemen and
A. Kapteyn
9230 R. Beetsma and
F. van der Ploeg
9231 G. Almekinders and
S. Eijffinger
9232 F. Vella and M. Verbeek
')23~ P. dr Bijl and S. Goy:d
')~.i4 J. Angrisl and G. Imbens
9235 L. Meijdam,
M. van de Ven
and H. Verbon
9236 H. Houba and
A. de Zeeuw
Core Implementation in Modified Strongand Coalition Proof
Nash Equilibria
TheJoint Estimation ofa Non-Linear Labour Supply Function
and a Wage Equation UsingSimulated Response Probabilities
Does Inequality Cause Inflation? - The Political Economy of
Inflation, Taxation and Government Debt
Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve Interventions - Do
they Affect the Level and Unexpected Volatility of the
DM~S-Rate?
Estimating the Impact of Endogenous Union Choice on
Wages Using Panel Data
Technological Change in Markets with Network Externalities
Average C:cusal Respunse with Variahle'I'reatmcnt Intensity
Strategic Decision Making and the Dynamics of Government
Debt
Strategic Bargaining for the Control of a Dynamic System in
State-Space Form
9237 A. Cameron and P. Trivedi Tests of Independence in Parametric Models: With
Applications and Illustrations
9238 J.-S. Pischke Individual Income, Incomplete Information, and Aggregate
Consumption
9239 H. Bloemen A Model of Labour Supply with Job Offer Restrictions
9240 F. Drost and Th. Nijman Temporal Aggregation of GARCH Processes
9241 R. Gilles, P. Ruys and Coalition Formation in Large Network Economies
J. Shou
9242 P. Kort The Effects of Marketable Pollution Permits on the Firm's
Optimal Investment Policies
')243 A.L. Bovenlx rg anJ
F. van der Ploeg
Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market
in a Second-Best World
9244 W.Q Gale and J.K. Scholz IRAs and Household Saving
9245 A. Bera and P. Ng Robust Tests for Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
Using Score Function
924G R.T. Baillie, C.F. Chung The Long Memory and Variability of Inflation: A Reappraisal
and M.A. Tieslau of the Friedman HypothesisNo. Author(s)





9251 S. Eijffinger and
E. Schaling




9301 N. Kahana and
S. Nitzan
9302 W. Guth and
S. Nitzan




930Ci B. Peleg and
S. Tijs
9307 G. Imbens and
T. Lancaster
9308 T. Ellingsen and
K.W~rneryd
Title
A Generalized Method of Moments Estimator for Long-
Memory Processes
Partisanship as Information
'lhc Wclfare liffccts uf Individual Rctircmcn~ Accounts
Job Search Theory, Labour Supply and Unemployment
Duration
Central Bank Independence: Searching for the Philosophers'
Stone
Environmental Taxation and Labor-Market Distortions
Permanent Income, Current Income and Consumption:
Evidence from Panel Data
Imperfect Credibility of the Band and Risk Premia in the
European Monetary System
Credibility and Duration ofPolitical Contests and the Eztent
of Rent Dissipation
Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?
Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams
EuICr Equations in Micro Data: Merging Data from Two
Samples
A Simple Justification of Quantity Competition and the
Cournot-Oligopoly Solution
The Consistency Principle For Games In Strategic Form
Case Control Studies With Contaminated Controls
Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of
Protection
9309 H. Bester Price Commitment in Search MarketsPn Rnx ~n153. 5000 LE TILBURG, THE NETHERLA~
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
YIBV~YII~~N~111N~M~1~